Modular Capital

AI Data Center Infrastructure

Power, Compute, and the Conversion Opportunity

The AI infrastructure buildout is one of the largest capital deployment cycles in technology history and it is constrained not by demand, but by the physical availability of power. The United States faces a projected power deficit of ~50 gigawatts through 2028.

Within this context, operators who already control energized large-scale power such as Bitcoin miners who secured grid infrastructure years in advance, find themselves uniquely positioned to capture a structural premium.

The conversion of mining infrastructure to high-performance computing (HPC) data centers is one of the few near-term ways to bring scarce power capacity to market.

Companies
Covered
Companies covered: Applied Digital, Bitfarms, CleanSpark, Core Scientific, Cipher Mining, Galaxy, Riot, Hut 8, TeraWulf, WhiteFiber
01

The Industry Investment Thesis

Artificial intelligence workloads require sustained high-density power at a scale and speed that the existing grid interconnection process cannot deliver. Training large language models and running GPU-intensive inference tasks demands thousands of chips operating in proximity, drawing electricity at densities that dwarf conventional enterprise data center requirements. The result is a supply/demand dislocation in energized power that is structural, multi-year in duration and largely insensitive to macro conditions. The compute intensity of AI tasks is also evolving in ways that systematically increase power demand per unit of economic output: while a simple chatbot query is computationally modest, chain-of-thought reasoning tasks require 100x the compute, video generation 3,000x, and deep research tasks potentially 1,000,000x the baseline.1 As AI use cases proliferate toward these more computationally intensive agentic applications, the length of tasks have been consistently exponentially increasing over the past 6 years, with a doubling time of around 7 months.2 The aggregate power demand per user and per dollar of AI-driven economic activity will continue to increase regardless of efficiency gains at the chip level.

The Power Bottleneck: AI's Defining Constraint

The single largest constraint on AI buildout timelines today is not chip availability or software capability, it is electricity. Hyperscaler capital expenditure alone is running at approximately $650 billion this year. Analysis of chip shipment forecasts and announced US data center construction suggests a power deficit of approximately 50 gigawatts between 2025 and 2028, driven by stronger-than-expected semiconductor demand.3 Data centers currently account for only 3–4% of total US grid consumption, but that figure is projected to reach 12% by 2028.9

The scale of individual lab demand illustrates the pressure. OpenAI's compute footprint has scaled from ~600 MW to ~2 GW and is expected to reach ~6 GW this year, potentially 12 GW next year. Similarly, Anthropic is on a similar trajectory. For every $100 billion of AI revenue generated at 50% gross margins, labs must spend $50 billion on compute, equivalent to 5 GW of capacity at ~$10 billion per GW annually. Given this shortage against overwhelming near-term demand, time to power is the key focus.

The gap cannot be closed quickly. Grid interconnection queues now stretch to four or more years for large loads. ERCOT, the Texas grid operator, alone has approximately 458 GW of pending applications in its interconnection queue.4 In a recent survey, more than half of developers report that securing power has become more difficult over the past twelve months. Utility respondents say time-to-power will take 2 years longer on average than expected by hyperscalers and colocation providers.5 Even within ERCOT, widely regarded as the most accessible US interconnection regime, the minimum timeline is approximately 300 days under ideal conditions, with current average timelines running closer to 3–5 years due to study backlogs.6 PJM, the grid operator that covers Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and much of the Northeast, is broadly viewed as the most constrained region in the country today, with new large-load interconnection effectively stalled. PJM's available supply capacity has declined 20% (40 GW) over the last four years, driven by plant retirements.10 Substations required for loads above 100 MW, now effectively universal for AI data center builds, add a further 18–24 months of delivery timeline, with large transformer procurement alone running 2–3 years.

The Power Cost Benchmark: Why Miner Conversions Win on Economics

Other than speed, the decision of where to source power is also a question of all-in cost per MWh, and that cost varies dramatically across the available options. Bitcoin miner conversions represent the lowest-cost path by a wide margin. Miners typically pass power through to tenants at $70–100/MWh, reflecting their underlying contracted rates of $30–50/MWh. Those economics largely reflect power contracts secured years ago, before scarcity became acute.

The alternatives each carry meaningfully higher costs and their own execution constraints:

Power Cost Benchmark

Power cost benchmarks: Miner cost $30-50/MWh, Miner revenue $70-100/MWh, Nuclear $80-100/MWh, Natural Gas Turbines $100/MWh, Fuel Cells $120-150/MWh, Space Data Centers $1000+/MWh.

The implication for investors is clear, operators with access to pre-contracted miner power at $30–50/MWh hold a structural cost advantage over every alternative path that is not replicable at any price in the near term, with a massive premium on near-term power availability. Announcements such as BE and Oracle’s recent 2.8 GW deal, along with Elon’s comments about data centers in space, highlight how acute the power shortage is and reinforce the view that BTC miner conversion, as the lowest-cost source of power, will be fully utilized before the market is forced toward more expensive and exotic alternatives.

A further structural advantage of Bitcoin site conversions has emerged beyond speed: political and community acceptability. Data center development has become an increasingly contentious issue, with communities pushing back against new builds over concerns about electricity bills and environmental externalities. Recent polling of US registered voters found that 60% hold AI data centers at least partly responsible for rising electricity prices 8. Bitcoin site conversions avoid this friction because they reuse existing grid access rather than requesting new incremental interconnection. An operator adding compute at an existing Bitcoin site does not increase the community's electricity burden in the way that a greenfield data center does.

50 GWProjected US power shortfall for data centers, 2025–2028
4+ yrsTypical utility wait time for new large-load interconnection
92%Developers citing grid constraints as their primary barrier
~$8–13MPer MW of critical IT for conversion

The Historical Role of Bitcoin Mining Infrastructure

Bitcoin mining's role in the AI infrastructure story is primarily historical and structural. Over the preceding decade, miners accumulated large-scale power infrastructure in Texas and other low-cost power markets, securing firm grid interconnection agreements that are now extraordinarily valuable given the scarcity environment. The industry collectively holds over 10 GW of approved capacity across US-listed operators, the single largest pool of readily convertible energized power available to AI developers anywhere in the country. A widely-used industry reference metric puts the revenue potential of this asset class into sharp relief: for every gigawatt of reliably delivered AI colocation capacity, operators can generate approximately $1-2 billion in annual revenue.

For the largest cloud providers, third-party colocation is typically a capacity bridge rather than the preferred long-term model. Hyperscalers and neoclouds turn to third-party colocation specifically when their own data center capacity has been exhausted and hardware risks sitting idle in warehouses unpowered. Given the alternative, GPU fleets generating zero revenue and depreciating while awaiting internal data center completions, the premium paid for ready third-party power is economically rational. The current environment, where internal capacity is fully spoken for across every major cloud provider, has effectively made colocation a necessity.

The economics of mining itself are deteriorating structurally. The scheduled Bitcoin halving, which cuts block rewards in half approximately every four years, progressively compresses mining profitability. With the next halving expected in 2028, the relative attractiveness of contracted HPC cash flows should continue to improve versus pure-play mining economics. This creates a natural and self-reinforcing conversion incentive: as mining margins compress, the relative attractiveness of long-term HPC lease revenues which are predictable, inflation-linked, and completely independent of BTC price grows commensurately.

Site Selection

Miners possess the four physical ingredients that AI developers most need but cannot quickly acquire: firm grid interconnection, large contiguous land parcels, experience managing high-density electrical infrastructure, and often below-market power contracts. There are a few other considerations when evaluating specific sites for conversion:

The convertible share of US mining capacity is more limited than aggregate power figures suggest given power contract terms. Some miners secured favorable power pricing precisely because they agreed to operate as flexible load: when the grid requests curtailment, they shut down. This arrangement is acceptable for Bitcoin mining, which can pause and resume without consequence, but is structurally incompatible with HPC workloads that require continuous, uninterrupted uptime. A data center that may go offline for hours during periods of grid stress cannot credibly host GPU clusters running training jobs or serving live inference traffic. Miners whose power purchase agreements include curtailment provisions, and whose contracts are not near expiration, are effectively unable to convert regardless of their physical infrastructure quality. Those who can renegotiate to firm, non-curtailable power typically face a meaningful price step-up, a cost increase that must be absorbed into lease economics but that unlocks access to the full AI tenant market.

The physical demands of AI infrastructure are also increasing with each GPU generation. Current Blackwell/GB200 systems draw approximately 120 kW per rack; Nvidia's next-generation Vera Rubin architecture is anticipated to require approximately 180 kW per rack; and NVIDIA's subsequent Kyber platform is expected to approach 1 MW per rack, a step-change in density that further widens the gap between what legacy mining facilities can support and what leading-edge AI clusters require. Sites that can support next-generation rack densities should command a premium over facilities limited to prior-generation power and cooling configurations.

Workload type also shapes footprint requirements. AI training, which involves running large model training runs across thousands of GPUs simultaneously, concentrates into a small number of very large clusters, often 1 GW or more, where GPU interconnect density and proximity matter most and geographic location is secondary. AI inference, serving live user queries, has fundamentally different requirements: latency sensitivity means inference infrastructure must be distributed across many smaller metro-adjacent sites close to end users.This bifurcation means that the addressable market for large-campus operators (training) and smaller metro-area operators (inference) is genuinely distinct, and that the supply of suitable sites for each workload type differs materially.

Network connectivity is an equally important and often underweighted site selection criterion alongside power. Fiber availability is a gating input for both training and inference workloads, moving large datasets in and out of training clusters requires high-capacity, low-latency connectivity, and inference sites must be well-connected to serve end users with acceptable response times. A site with abundant power but weak fiber connectivity is effectively unusable for high-value AI workloads, regardless of its electricity cost profile.

"Access to energized, large-scale power is the scarcest resource in the AI economy and it cannot be manufactured on demand."

The Colocation vs. Cloud Services Spectrum

Operators converting mining capacity to HPC can pursue two distinct business models with meaningfully different risk and return profiles.

HPC Colocation is the dominant structure in the current market: the operator constructs a powered shell providing electricity, cooling, and physical infrastructure, while the tenant owns the GPU equipment and IT stack. This model delivers highly predictable revenues (fixed $/MW/year with embedded annual 2-3% escalators) strong EBITDA margins of 80–90%, and significant leverage capacity through debt at 80% LTC. Equity value is estimated at approximately $5–10 million per gross MW. Converting an existing mining site to a fully liquid-cooled AI data center carries an all-in cost of approximately $10 million per MW, reflecting the scope of the rebuild required, which underscores why the quality of the underlying power asset, rather than the legacy mining facility itself, is the primary driver of value in conversion transactions.

Cloud Services is a higher-risk, higher-reward full-stack model in which the operator builds the powered shell but also acquires and operates GPU fleets, selling compute capacity to end users. IREN is a BTC miner which is converting its data centers and buying GPUs to sell to Microsoft directly. This puts them in similar competition with other neoclouds, such as CoreWeave and Nebius. This captures the full economics of GPU utilization but requires substantial ongoing capital expenditure with GPU useful life of 4-5 years, deeper technical capabilities on orchestrating GPU fleets, and exposure to GPU pricing, availability and utilization.

The Hyperscaler vs. Neocloud Tenant Dynamic

The tenant landscape divides into two categories with distinct commercial characteristics. Hyperscalers (e.g. Microsoft, Meta, Google, Amazon) offer superior credit quality and access to cheaper project financing, but negotiate harder on unit economics, prefer to control data center infrastructure, and typically achieve slightly lower developer EBITDA margins. Neocloud operators (e.g. CoreWeave, Fluidstack, Nebius, Lambda, Crusoe) typically have higher financing costs and therefore need to pay higher premiums.

The optimal tenant portfolio blends both: a hyperscaler anchor provides credit quality and lower financing cost; neocloud tenants provide yield enhancement and are typically quicker to execute. Deals partially backstopped by hyperscalers, where a hyperscaler guarantees a neocloud's lease obligations in exchange for rights as Google has done with Fluidstack and a handful of miners, offer a middle path that has emerged as a meaningful structural innovation in the market.

02

Transaction Comparables

A growing dataset of executed transactions now provides empirical grounding for HPC data center valuations. The following table summarizes the most significant recent colocation deals across US-listed operators, illustrating the range of commercial terms.

Tenant Provider Date Eff. IT (MW) Rev/MW ($M) EBITDA Margin Unlev. Yield
AMD RIOT 1/16/26 25 $1.24 80% 27.9%
Nscale WYFI 12/18/25 40 $2.17 85% 18.4%
Anthropic / Fluidstack HUT 12/17/25 245 $1.91 97% 18.5%
AMZN CIFR 11/3/25 214 $1.71 85% 15.3%
Hyperscaler APLD 10/22/25 200 $1.67 86% 11.9%
Fluidstack CIFR 9/25/25 168 $1.79 85% 16.0%
Fluidstack WULF 8/14/25 360 $1.86 85% 17.6%
CRWV APLD 6/2/25 400 $1.83 88% 13.4%
CRWV GLXY 4/23/25 526 $1.90 90% 12.5%
CRWV CORZ 2/26/25 590 $1.44 78% 37.2%
Core42 WULF 12/23/24 60 $1.50 70% 17.5%
Total / Average 2,828 $1.73 85% 18.7%

Source: Company disclosures. Total row sums effective IT (MW); other columns are simple averages across deals.

Several important observations emerge from this dataset. Revenue per critical IT watt has generally been trending upwards, reflecting intensifying demand and a tight power supply environment. The value creation per watt generated in successive transactions has been increasing materially, from approximately $5-8/watt in mid-2025 transactions to approximately $10+/watt towards the end of 2025. The broader comp dataset, which shows a rising trend across consecutive deals, suggests the market for energized power is tightening rather than normalizing. Contract tenors have also held consistent with 10–15 year initial terms, with 2–3 five-year renewal options, which improves the terminal value.

03

Operator Landscape: Live Comp Sheet

BTC miner prices are very volatile with an average of 3x beta to Nasdaq and 1.2x to BTC and 10-30% short interest. To keep the analysis useful over time, investors should use the live comp sheet to track where each operator is trading and how it compares with implied NAV.

The comp sheet is intended to be a live valuation tool and comparability across operators requires a standardized lens. One useful cross-sectional measure is adjusted equity value per approved megawatt, calculated as market cap plus debt, less crypto assets, cash, and conversion capex already spent, primarily construction in progress. This adjustment helps normalize for differences in capital structure and project timing, giving investors a cleaner read on how much approved HPC capacity the market is already pricing in.

As an example, using a $7 million per MW benchmark then shows where each operator trades relative to NAV.

How to use the sheet

Operator Ticker Adjusted EV ($M) Approved MW (Gross) Multiple ($/MW) % NAV on Approved MW at $7 MW
WhiteFiber WYFI 189 115 1.65 24%
Bitfarms BITF 1,131 648 1.74 25%
Riot Platforms RIOT 3,579 1,700 2.11 30%
TeraWulf WULF 8,325 2,870 2.90 41%
Galaxy Digital Inc. GLXY 5,187 1,630 3.18 45%
Core Scientific CORZ 6,705 2,095 3.20 46%
Applied Digital APLD 6,552 1,586 4.13 59%
CleanSpark CLSK 2,583 535 4.83 69%
Hut 8 HUT 5,654 1,040 5.44 78%
Cipher Mining CIFR 7,427 970 7.66 109%
Total 47,332 13,189 3.59 51%
Median 3.19 46%

Data as of March 31, 2026. Adjusted equity value = market cap + debt, less crypto assets, cash and PPE (CIP). % Upside assuming $7M/MW (range $5-10M/MW) colocation equity value. Source: Company filings, public disclosures.

The sector has 13 GW of approved power and is valued at ~$4M equity value per approved MW. Since May of 2025 and following a wave of neocloud deal announcements, the miners on average have gained 142% vs. the S&P 500's 10% vs. Bitcoin's -35% over the same period. The market has started to recognize but not yet fully priced the conversion opportunity.

May 2025 – March 2026 Returns

Returns: Miners (avg) +142%, SPY +10%, QQQ +10%, Bitcoin −35%.

Source: Artemis

04

Valuation Framework

Businesses transitioning from Bitcoin mining to HPC data center operation require a multi-part valuation framework that separately values each company's specific contracted deals and probability of pipeline and economics, cross-checked against the growing dataset of executed transactions.

Investment Framework

Component Valuation Method Key Assumptions Equity Value Benchmark
Contracted HPC: Colocation
Signed leases, revenue-generating
Discounted NAV 10% discount rate, 80% LTC, 8% interest, 85–95% EBITDA margin $5–10M / gross MW per transacted deals
Approved but unleased capacity
Grid-approved; tenant pending
Probability-weighted NAV 80–95% probability; similar unit economics to contracted phases Probability × contracted NAV
Pipeline capacity under study
Regulatory approval pending
Probability-weighted NAV 10–30% probability; similar economics 10–30% of full-approval NAV
Residual mining business
Existing hashrate operations
DCF BTC price assumptions; network hashrate; next halving in 2028 Assume zero given valuation largely in conversion
Bitcoin / Digital Assets
BTC and other digital assets held on balance sheet
Spot Spot prices 1x NAV spot
Total equity value = sum of above, less net debt (or plus net cash)

Discounted NAV: Key Inputs and Sensitivities

The REIT Conversion: Material Optionality

An underappreciated dimension of value is the REIT conversion or strategic acquisition optionality embedded in large-scale data center portfolios. An illustrative analysis on a fully built-out 1 Gross GW campus (666 critical MW) generates annual revenue of $1.3 billion at $2M/MW, EBITDA of $1.2 billion at 90% margin, and at a 20-25x EV/EBITDA multiple. These multiples are consistent with where traded data center REITs such as Equinix and Digital Realty have traded. This results in a $27 billion enterprise value. Assuming an initial buildout cost of $10M/MW ($6.6B) with 80% LTC results in an initial equity cost of $1.3B and debt of $5.3B. The resulting equity value is $22 billion. This represents ~17x on the equity invested in construction.

Even a partial monetization, such as a sale-leaseback of completed phases to a data center REIT, would crystallize embedded value at multiples well above current market implied valuations and provide capital to fund subsequent phases without dilutive equity issuance. This optionality is excluded from most base-case models and represents a layer of upside that is real, precedented in the broader data center industry.

05

Investment Selection Criteria

Not all participants in this space warrant equivalent conviction. The following criteria differentiate operators with durable competitive advantages from those exposed to commodity dynamics or execution risk.

Power Portfolio Quality

Execution Capability and Financial Position

Relative Value: The Market-Implied Conversion Screen

"The floor valuation is contractually anchored by long-dated leases. The optionality is not fully priced while having bounded downside."

06

Key Risks & Mitigants

A few of the key risks and their corresponding structural mitigants are detailed below.

High Impact

AI Capex Normalization

A slowdown in hyperscaler and neocloud AI investment, driven by ROI disappointment, model efficiency gains reducing per-task compute requirements, or credit market disruption, would compress new lease pricing and reduce the addressable market for incremental capacity. Model architecture improvements that dramatically reduce inference compute requirements represent the most structurally threatening version of this risk. The key mitigant is the long-term, fixed-revenue nature of contracted leases (10–15 years), which insulate contracted capacity from near-term volume swings once signed. Furthermore, BTC mining sites remain the lowest cost provider of power.

High Impact

Tenant Concentration & Credit Risk

Several operators have signed initial colocation agreements with neocloud companies that carry high debt-funded capex burdens and concentrated revenue exposure to a small number of AI model developers. In a tenant bankruptcy scenario, the data center developer typically becomes an unsecured creditor for unpaid lease obligations and may face re-leasing periods of 12–24 months. The partial hyperscaler backstop structure, where a major cloud provider guarantees neocloud lease obligations in exchange for rights, is the strongest available structural mitigant.

High Impact

Grid Approval Unpredictability

ERCOT's approval process operates with limited transparency and discretionary authority. Studies can extend timelines significantly, and approval conditions may require costly infrastructure upgrades that increase project costs and delay cash flow timelines.

High Impact

Construction Execution Risk

HPC data center construction is highly complex with industrial supply chain dependencies that face constrained global supply. Management teams need credible DC construction experience or partnerships with established development firms. Labor is also a key constraint — Stargate required 5,500 workers at peak. Mining facilities were designed around air-cooled setups, while high-density AI deployments require advanced liquid cooling. The market has shown it prices execution risk immediately: a one-quarter delay from Core Scientific in 3Q25 sent CoreWeave shares down 16%.

Medium Impact

GPU Cloud Services Execution

Operators pursuing Cloud Services (owning and operating GPU fleets) face compounding risks absent in pure colocation, including GPU procurement timing relative to product release cycles, utilization rate volatility, rapid technological obsolescence of current-generation chips, and balance sheet intensity of regular refresh cycles. The business also requires skills that mining management teams may not fully possess.

Medium Impact

Regulatory & Policy Risk

Federal and state-level policy intervention represents an underappreciated risk vector. FERC Order 2023 implementation could reshape interconnection queue dynamics; state legislatures in Virginia, Texas, and elsewhere have begun considering data center siting restrictions and cost-allocation rules that would shift transmission upgrade costs onto large loads; and evolving EPA rules on behind-the-meter gas generation could raise the cost of the most common alternative to grid power. Any of these could materially alter the economics or timing of conversions already in progress.

07

Catalysts

The following observable events are likely to materially re-rate valuations over the next 12–24 months.

08

Conclusion

The AI infrastructure buildout is the dominant capital deployment theme of the current technology cycle, and power scarcity is its defining constraint. The United States faces a 50 GW power deficit for data centers through 2028, a gap that cannot be closed quickly through the normal grid interconnection process. Within this context, operators who already control energized large-scale power, assembled through Bitcoin mining operations over the preceding decade, hold a structural advantage that billions of dollars in fresh capital cannot quickly replicate.

The transaction dataset is now sufficient to anchor valuation with confidence: deals have cleared at $1.25–$2.20 per critical IT watt per year with 80–97% EBITDA margins and equity values of $5–10 million per gross MW in colocation. Applied against the publicly disclosed approved capacity of listed operators, the sector in aggregate is pricing approximately 50% of approved capacity as converted, with optionality in the pipeline.

The most asymmetric opportunities are where this ratio is lowest: operators with large approved portfolios, credible execution track records, and adjusted equity values implying conversion of only 35–45% of approved capacity. For these operators, each incremental grid approval and tenant announcement is a step-change event and the gap between the contracted-capacity valuation floor and the full-portfolio bull case is wide enough to generate compelling returns even under base-case conversion assumptions.

Footnotes

  1. Applied Digital
  2. METR
  3. Morgan Stanley
  4. ERCOT
  5. 2026 Data Center Report, Data Center Frontier
  6. ERCOT
  7. Economics of Orbital vs Terrestrial Data Centers
  8. The Center Square
  9. U.S. Department of Energy
  10. S&P Global Market Intelligence

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